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NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE
to conduct a pretrial examination of the other would be denied. 135
More modem decisions, interpreting Section 193-a(2) of the CPA,
have held that since a third-party defendant is a party to the action
for all purposes and, usually, is the real defendant in the action
because he may ultimately be required to satisfy the original plain-
tiff's claim, the third-party defendant would be permitted to
examine the original plaintiff regardless of whether the formal
pleadings created an issue betveen them. 130
The present statute, Section 1008 of the CPLR, grants a third-
party defendant all the rights of a party adverse to the other
parties to the action. By designating him an adverse party, sec-
tion 1008 has adopted the modern approach and, hence, the
third-party defendant is immediately afforded the same rights as
the original defendant. One of the rights of the original defendant
is the right to conduct a pretrial examination of one of his code-
fendants although neither asserted a claim against the other.13 7
Therefore, since the original defendant could have conducted a
pretrial examination of his codefendant as to all issues involved
in the main action and since the third-party defendant under CPLR
Section 1008 and under later CPA decisions is immediately afforded
the rights of the original defendant, it would seem that the court,
by not permitting the third-party defendant to occupy fully the
position of the third-party plaintiff (a codefendant in the main
action), has not decided the question within the spirit of section
1008.
Party Taking His Own Testimony
In Lapensky v. Gordon,138 the defendant moved to vacate
plaintiff's notice to take a deposition of plaintiff's own testimony.
The court denied the motion by liberally construing the pertinent
provisions of the CPLR.
Section 288 of the CPA provided that "any party to an action
. . .may cause to be taken by deposition, before trial, his own
135 E.g., Salgo v. Amdor Structures, 133 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Sup. Ct. 1954);
Gfle v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct), 2d case, aff'd,
281 App. Div. 95, 120 N.Y.S.2d 258 (3d Dep't 1952); Reizer v. Pardes,
197 Misc. 384, 98 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Anida Realty Corp. v.
6145 Realty Corp., 197 Misc. 157, 94 N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Foote
v. Joseph Bisceglia & Sons, 195 Misc. 19, 80 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct.
1948).
13 6 Argento v. Beech & Bowne Building Corp., 37 Misc. 2d 513, 236
N.Y.S.2d 462 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Sorrentino v. City of N.Y., 14 Misc. 2d 78,
178 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct 1958).
13 7 Hensel v. Held, 17 App. Div. 2d 806, 233 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1st Dep't 1962)
(memorandum decision); Frost v. Walsh, 195 Misc. 391, 90 N.Y.S.2d 174,
aff'd, 275 App. Div. 1017, 91 N.Y.S.2d 689 (3d Dep't 1949) (memorandum
decision).
13841 Misc. 2d 958, 246 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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testimony or that of any other party. . . ." Rule 3106(a) of the
CPLR provides that "after an action is commenced, any party may
take the testimony of any person by deposition .... " In comparing
the two provisions, it can be observed that the CPLR provision
is not as clear as was its CPA counterpart in establishing whether
a party can take a deposition of his own testimony. Since this
failure to retain the provision as worded in the CPA was not
discussed in either the Advisory Committee or the Senate Finance
Committee reports,' 39 the court was called upon to decide whether
the CPLR permits a party to take a deposition of his own testi-
mony.
Several arguments have been made in favor of allowing such
self-deposition under the CPLR:
(1) By reading rule 3106(a), which provides that "any party
may take the testimony of any person" in conjunction with
rule 3106(b), which provides that "where the person to be exam-
ined is not a party" one could reasonably conclude that "person"
in rule 3106(a) means a party to the action.140
(2) By reading the first sentence of rule 3107, which provides
that "a party desiring to take the deposition of any person . . .
shall give to each party ten days' notice" in conjunction with
the last sentence in rule 3107, which provides that "a party to be
examined pursuant to notice served by another party" .it can
be concluded that the first sentence of rule 3107 allows a party
to "take the deposition of himself or any other person."'14
(3) Section 3101 (a) (1), which provides that "there shall be
full disclosure of all evidence . . . by a party" may be reason-
ably construed to permit a party to take his own testimony. 42
Under the mandated liberal interpretation of the CPLR, 143 it
would appear that a party should be permitted to take a deposition
of his own testimony under any of the suggested constructions. In
addition, the Senate Finance Committee stated that the scope of
disclosure which existed under the CPA has been carried over into
the CPLR. 44  If a party were not permitted to take his own
deposition, the scope of disclosure would be narrower under the
CPLR than under the CPA. Such a result is obviously not in
accord with the avowed intention of the CPLR's draftsmen. 1 45
139 CARmoDY-FoRKOSCH, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 623, at 561 (8th ed. 1963).140 Id. at 560-61.
141 Ibid.
142 3 WEImNSTrN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 13101.22,
at 31-26 (1963).
143 CPLR § 104.
144 SIXTH REP. 30, 43.
145 It has been suggested that, at worst, in any instance in which dis-
closure would have been permitted under the CPA it should be permitted
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However, it would be helpful to have legislative resolution of this
apparent ambiguity.
It should also be noted that the language used by the court
in the Lapensky case is that the plaintiff sought to "perpetuate"
her testimony. While any deposition is a kind of "perpetuation"
of testimony, the word should be avoided on such facts as those
of Lapensky on two grounds. First, the CPA allowed a party to
take a deposition of his testimony as an absolute right and there
was no requirement that the purpose be the perpetuation of
testimony. Secondly, section 3102(c) is the real "perpetuation"
of testimony section; it reserves the word to the endeavor of a
person to take a deposition before an action is commenced. Note
that such a deposition requires a court order; mere notice may
not be used for a pre-action deposition.
Attorney's Work Product and Material Prepared
for Litigation
In Babcock v. Jackson,146 the plaintiff moved to have a
certain statement produced for examination. The statement had
been taken from the defendant by an adjustment bureau em-
ployed by the insurance company which represented the defendant.
In an affidavit, plaintiff's attorney stated that the reason for such
inspection was the mislaying by the police officer of certain notes
pertaining to conversations between the officer and the defendant,
now deceased. Hence, the defendant's statement could not be
obtained in any other manner. The court held that since the
statement was taken by a claim adjuster in the course of a
routine investigation, and not by an attorney or his agent in
preparation for trial, this single circumstance rendered the state-
ment subject to inspection. Such statements obtained by claim
adjusters are not immunized by subdivisions (c) and (d) (which
respectively protect an attorney's work product and material he
prepares for litigation).
Section 3101(c) grants to an attorney's work product un-
qualified immunity from inspection. However, when that pro-
vision was originally drafted, the work product was to be pro-
tected from disclosure "unless the court finds that withholding it
will result in injustice or undue hardship .. .. "147 The Revisers in-
tended to adopt the rule laid down in Hickman v. Taylor, that an
attorney's work product is protected from disclosure unless "good
cause" for revealing it is shown.1 48 When section 3101(c) was
under the CPLR. 3 WEINSTEIN, XoRN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE
13101.01 (1963).
14640 Misc. 2d 757, 243 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
147FIRST REP. 119.
148329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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